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Abstract
Rahima Bano, the world’s last endemic case of severe smallpox, Variola Major, developed rash on 
October 16, 1975 on Bhola Island, Bangladesh. Achieving eradication in a country destroyed by 
war challenged the achievement of smallpox eradication. Between January 1, 1972 and December 
31, 1975, 225,000 smallpox cases and 45,000 smallpox deaths occurred. Adapting the global 
smallpox eradication strategies of surveillance, the detection of smallpox cases, and containment, 
the interruption of smallpox transmission, utilized progress toward three objectives to monitor 
performance: 1) Surveillance – the percent smallpox infected villages detected within 14 days of 
the first case of rash, 2) Knowledge of the Reward – public knowledge of the current amount of 
the reward for reporting smallpox, and 3) Containment – the percent of infected villages 
interrupting smallpox transmission within 14 days of detection. Failures to achieve these 
objectives led to identification and implementation of improved strategies that eventually achieved 
eradication. Essential to this success was a tripartite partnership of the citizens of Bangladesh, the 
Bangladesh Ministry of Health and its field staff, and personnel and resources mobilized by the 
World Health Organization.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 1971, Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, declared independence when Pakistan 
refused to seat the Awami League majority elected in December of 1970. Civil repression by 
the Pakistani military led to an estimated 3 million deaths and the exodus of 10 million 
persons to refugee camps in India [1]. In November of 1971, smallpox broke out in Salt 
Lake Refugee Camp near Calcutta. Before smallpox control could be initiated, invasion of 
Indian troops ended the repression and liberation was achieved on December 16, 1972. 
Infected and susceptible refugees crowded aboard trains, buses, and boats for the trip home. 
The country, which had been smallpox free in 1971, was re-infected with smallpox.
Over a four year period (1972-75), an estimated 225,000 smallpox cases and 40,000 
smallpox deaths occurred in Bangladesh. With an infrastructure destroyed by war, major 
floods and severe famine in 1974, and two coups d’état, Bangladesh was initially incapable 
of controlling its smallpox epidemic. As described in this paper, use of evidence at the field 
level led to the evolution of successful eradication strategies. Rahima Bano, the world’s last 
case of the severe form of smallpox, Variola Major, developed rash on October 16, 1975 
[2:38-48].
PROGRAM INDICATORS TO MONITOR ERADICATION PROGRAM 
PERFORMANCE
As the Bangladesh Smallpox Eradication Program evolved, three indicators emerged, each 
measuring the effectiveness of field operations in a key area: 1) surveillance – the detection 
of smallpox infected villages, 2) public knowledge of the amount of the reward for reporting 
new smallpox infected villages, and 3) containment – the ability to interrupt smallpox 
transmission within 14 days of detection of an infected village. Perhaps the most important 
legacy of the Bangladesh Smallpox Program was the identification and use of failures to 
achieve objectives as drivers to improve program operations.
Surveillance
The surveillance indicator was defined as the percent of infected villages detected within 14 
days of rash onset in the first smallpox case in that village. While only 11% of smallpox 
cases were reported in 1972, 53.8 % of 4,108 smallpox infected villages identified in 1975 
were detected within one week of onset of smallpox rash in the first case; 74.1% were 
detected within 2 weeks [2: 87].
Public Knowledge of Amount of the Reward
In August of 1974, a monetary reward was introduced for the reporting of new smallpox 
infected villages; eight months later, only 30% of the public knew about the reward. 
Doubling and publicizing the reward through visits to 12 million houses increased 
knowledge to over 80%.
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Containment
The containment indicator was defined as the percentage of infected villages with no new 
smallpox cases 15 or more days after identification. The percentage of containment failures 
decreased from 27% in November of 1974 to 1% in September of 1995.
SURVEILLANCE
Eradication of smallpox required effective surveillance including the identification and 
reporting of smallpox cases, the analysis of data, the preparation and distribution of reports, 
and most importantly, use of this data to strengthen surveillance and containment [3]. As the 
new government struggled to reestablish a functioning health system, 10,734 smallpox cases 
were reported in 1972. An estimated 81,000 smallpox cases were not reported. Reasons for 
the low 11% level of reporting related in part to traditional beliefs: for Moslems, smallpox 
was the will of Allah; for Hindus, smallpox was the visitation of the Goddess Shitala Mata; 
and for most Bangladeshis, reporting was never responded to and was therefore thought to 
be useless. Health officers were reluctant to report smallpox because cases were an 
admission of failure to follow orders to vaccinate everyone.
In 1972, the World Health Organization’s Global Smallpox Eradication Program assisted the 
Ministry of Health with five epidemiologists and the funding of five four-man, motorcycle-
equipped surveillance teams. These teams visited markets and schools showing the picture 
of a person with smallpox and searching for individuals reported to have similar rash 
illnesses. Positive reports were investigated. Smallpox, when confirmed, was contained 
through focal vaccination of available residents and neighbors of the infected household. 
During 1973 and 1974, the number of surveillance teams increased from 5 in 1973 to 18 in 
1974, 1 per district; the number of reported smallpox infections declined from a high of 
32,711 in 1973 to 16,485 in 1974. Each year, smallpox incidence increased during the 
spring, February-May and decreased at the end of the rainy season, August-November, 
Figure 2.
Smallpox-Infected Villages
Although smallpox in Bangladesh occurred in both rural and urban locations, each infected 
area was designated as an infected village, a metric for surveillance. The number of 
smallpox cases per infected village ranged from one to hundreds. Each infected village was 
mapped, the houses numbered, and the population living within ½ mile enumerated. 
Investigations were carried out to trace the source of infection and to identify residents and 
contacts that had travelled away from the infected villages. Smallpox teams working in the 
destination villages were notified by radio of the possible arrival of an infected individual. 
Many cross notifications led to the identification of smallpox cases in the first few days of 
illness.
Recognizing that smallpox eradication was failing, an emergency plan was developed in 
April of 1974 [2: 257-260]. This plan decentralized authority for surveillance and 
containment to the Thana level (similar to a district with an average population of 200,000) 
and designated the most qualified health or malaria officer responsible for smallpox 
Foster et al. Page 3
Vaccine. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 December 11.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
surveillance and containment. The number of smallpox-infected outbreaks fell from 949 in 
April of 1974 to 91 in October of 1974, Figure 1A. Eradication was predicted for December 
of 1974. Floods, the worst in 50 years, devastated the two most heavily infected areas in the 
northern part of the country. With houses and crops destroyed, the affected population 
migrated to the cities of Dhaka, Mymensingh, and Bogra in search of food and survival. 
Known smallpox infected villages increased from 91 in October of 1974 to 572 in January 
of 1975, Figure 1B.
Concerned about the increasing numbers of homeless people in the cities, the Government 
ordered the destruction of slums in Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna. Departing 
slum dwellers from Dhaka disseminated smallpox throughout the country. Smallpox infected 
villages increased to 1,132 in March of 1975 and 1,280 in April of 1975, Figures 1C and 1D. 
The number of reported smallpox infections increased from a low of 308 in October of 1994 
to 3,948 in April of 1975.
Reward for Reporting Smallpox
To increase the completeness of reporting, a 50 Taka (US$6) reward was introduced for the 
reporting of a previously undetected smallpox infected village in August of 1974. Mass 
publicity included banners, radio messages, pamphlets and posters on rickshaws, buses, 
boats, and walls. By May of 1975, a field survey documented that only 30% of the public 
knew about the reward. Further studies documented that health workers were reluctant to 
inform the public about the reward for fear that the public reporter rather than the health 
worker would receive the money. Doubling the reward to pay both the public reporter and 
the health worker, who confirmed a new smallpox infected village, solved the problem.
As the number of smallpox infected villages fell, the amount of the reward increased from 
50 to 100, then to 250, and finally to 500 Takas (about US$50). Public knowledge of the 
reward increased from 65% in September of 1975 to 87% in January of 1976, Table 1. 
Rewards were always presented at public ceremonies to further promote public reporting; 
$US 25,000 in reward money was expended during the program.
House-to-House Survey
In the spring of 1975, undetected chains of smallpox transmission continuing for weeks 
were uncovered. House-to-house surveys, as developed in India, were introduced. Building 
on a method applied earlier by the Malaria Eradication Program, each house was numbered 
and local area maps were drawn. Each of the 12,000 health workers was assigned 1,000 
houses to search. At each house, residents were shown the smallpox picture-card, informed 
about the reward for reporting smallpox, and asked if they knew of any persons with a 
similar rash illness. In each of the five nation-wide surveys, 12 million houses were targeted 
for the house-to-house search. These searches were completed in 5-9 days and were effective 
in identifying unknown chains of transmission (Table 1, Columns 1-3). Each nation-wide 
survey required an estimated 100,000 person-days of labor.
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Quality Assurance of House-to House Surveys
Following each search, a random sample of villages and houses was surveyed by senior 
Ministry of Health Officials to determine the percent of houses actually visited during the 
search and the percent of respondents who knew the amount of the reward. Results of these 
quality assurance visits are presented in Table 1, Column 4-7. The percent of houses visited 
increased from 78% to 90%. Given that the amount of the award increased at regular 
intervals, correct knowledge of the amount of the reward measured the timeliness of their 
knowledge; the percentage of correct knowledge of the amount of the reward peaked at 90% 
in May of 1976.
Smallpox Scar Survey to Assess Reporting Effectiveness
In November of 1975, Hughes and colleagues surveyed 465,892 individuals for smallpox 
facial scarring [4]. Each scarred individual was asked if their illness occurred prior to or 
after the end of the war. Using a calendar of local events, cases with smallpox after 
liberation (December 16, 1971) were further queried to determine the year of smallpox 
onset. Annual incidence rates were estimated by correcting for scarring loss and smallpox-
specific and non-smallpox mortality. Figure 3 shows reported smallpox, estimated 
unreported smallpox, and surveillance effectiveness. Detection and reporting of smallpox 
increased from 11.8% in 1972 to 83% in 1975. The reporting rate exceeded 95% during the 
last 6 months of 1975.
MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and subsequent 
intentional spread of anthrax in the United States, the possible use of smallpox as a biologic 
weapon emerged as a concern. Mathematical models were used as tools for developing 
potential response strategies. Before using the model to inform public policy [5], it was 
evaluated using existing smallpox data sets including Bangladesh. This evaluation provided 
a new understanding of the epidemiology of smallpox in Bangladesh.
Efficiency of Reporting
Because the efficiency of smallpox reporting in Bangladesh increased temporally, the 
logistic function, y(t) = 1/[1 + exp(a − bt)], where a and b are regression coefficients and t is 
time in years since 1 January 1971, was fitted to ratios of annual numbers of cases reported 
and estimated by Hughes [4]. Fitting involves choosing coefficients that minimize the sum 
of squared deviations (differences between the ratios and curve at mid-year). As mentioned 
above, reporting efficiency increased from about 10% in 1972 to over 80% in 1976, Figure 
4.
Monthly smallpox cases were estimated by multiplying the numbers officially reported by 
the government of Bangladesh to the World Health Organization (and published in its 
Weekly Epidemiologic Record at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/wer/) by the reciprocal of y(t), 
the time-varying reporting efficiency derived from the facial scar survey, Figure 5. The 
decreasing gaps between reported and estimated cases over time provide evidence on the 
increasing effectiveness of smallpox surveillance.
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Evaluation of the Model
These monthly “observations” were converted into weekly ones via the Expand Procedure 
(SAS Institute Inc., SAS Campus Drive, Cary, North Carolina 27513), a means of changing 
the interval between successive observations without changing their sum. The predicted 
cases were then compared to these weekly observations, adjusting initial conditions and 
coefficients of the harmonic function by which we modeled seasonal variation in the 
infection rate.
In the transmission model, the infection rate, β(t) = β0 + β1 cos (2πωt) + β2 sin (2πωt), 
where π is a mathematical constant (the ratio of any circle’s circumference to its diameter), t 
is time and ω is frequency (reciprocal of the period between successive observations). The 
mean, β0 and harmonic coefficients, β1 and β2 were estimated via the least squares 
procedure described above. Predicted and “observed” cases of smallpox in Bangladesh, 
1972-75, are presented in Figure 6.
Predictions resemble these adjusted observations in magnitude and timing, but not the year-
to-year variation accompanying the resettlement of refugees from India. Delayed detection 
of cases in 1972 and early 1973 may have contributed to the apparent disparities. 
Alternatively, recall of onset dates may have become imprecise with time, possibly 
explaining why the model fits the reconstructed annual curves less well in 1972 and 1973 
than it does in later years.
Seasonality of Smallpox
Smallpox is known in Bangla, the language of Bangladesh, as Guti Boshonto, the word for 
spring rash, the time of the maximum number of cases. Conventional wisdom was that 
maximum transmission occurred during these peak months, April-May, with minimum 
transmission occurring during October-November, the months of the lowest number of 
cases. Modeling clearly shows otherwise; maximum transmission occurred from November 
to March, Figure 7. Numerous explanations have been offered for this phenomenon: low 
temperature, low humidity, movement home at the end of the rice harvest season, and 
religious festivals. Transmission reaches its nadir in July, the start of the monsoon season.
Reproduction Number
The number of secondary infections per infectious person deduced from the smallpox 
transmission model resembles that reported by field epidemiologists, who estimated r from 
the exponential growth model, N(t) = N(0)exp(rt), early in outbreaks [2: 82-85]. In their 
model, N(0) and N(t) are the numbers of cases at times 0 and t, respectively, r is the growth 
rate, and t is time. They observed that the doubling time, td = ln(2)/r, approximated the serial 
interval, or period between successive generations of cases. As can be seen from this figure, 
ℜ ≈ 2 initially, but successive peaks approach ℜ = 1, the elimination threshold.
CONTAINMENT
Containment was designed to interrupt smallpox transmission in each identified infected 
village. The containment strategy, as it evolved over time, had multiple tasks:
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• Isolation of the smallpox case or cases in their home(s)
• Posting of guards at all infected households 24 hours per day to ensure isolation 
of the smallpox cases and to vaccinate residents and visitors
• Enumerating, vaccinating and following-up vaccinees to ensure successful 
vaccination of all residents and visitors of infected houses
• Searching all houses situated within ½ mile of the infected houses including 
numbering of each house, enumeration and vaccination of all residents and 
visitors, and follow-up visits to document successful vaccination
• Searching all markets, schools, and homes situated between ½ and five miles of 
the infected houses for individuals with fever or rash
• Cross notification of travel of potential smallpox contacts to smallpox teams by 
radio
Containment 1972
In the post-conflict situation, surveillance and containment were the responsibility of the five 
regional surveillance-containment teams. Containment was initially limited to the 
vaccination of available household and neighborhood contacts on the day of investigation. 
Revisits to infected villages, however, identified continued transmission among residents and 
visitors absent at the time of vaccination.
Containment 1973
As health systems were reestablished, local health workers were ordered to remain in the 
infected villages to enforce isolation and to vaccinate contacts and neighbors until 
transmission was interupted. Follow-up of infected villages again identified continuing 
smallpox transmission. Health workers refused to spend nights in the infected villages 
during the times of maximum population density, and explained that there were no places to 
eat or sleep.
Containment 1974
In November of 1974, monthly assessment of the number and percent of infected villages 
with cases 15 days after detection was established as a critical indicator. In that month, 27% 
of outbreaks had new cases 15 or more days after the infected village had been identified 
and containment procedures initiated. As failures were identified and causes found, the 
containment protocol was modified to address the causes of the failures. Table 2 provides 
examples of causes of containment failures and corrective actions taken.
Many of these failures were identified by staff who worked 25 days a month in the field, 
many for four years. This process of identification of failures and initiation of remedial 
action is exemplified by Sabour, a surveillance team leader. Sabour became distressed when 
11 of 17 infected villages had new cases after 14 days. On further investigation, he 
discovered that household members were not reporting relatives who had come to visit. 
because they did not consider relatives as visitors. Adding a list of relatives to the protocol 
solved the problem. As containment failures were identified and the protocol was 
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strengthened, the rate of containment failures decreased from 27% in November of 1974 to 
1% in September of 1975, Figure 8.
DRIVERS OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
In reflecting on smallpox eradication in Bangladesh 35 years after eradication, five drivers 
emerge as critical to the program’s success.
Leadership
As data identified the complexity of smallpox eradication, leadership and field operations 
were decentralized: initially to the five divisions, then to the 19 districts, then to the 56 
subdivisions, and finally to 415 Thanas. At each level, individuals took on smallpox 
eradication as his/her personal challenge. Three individuals exemplify this commitment and 
leadership that kept the team together and ready to fight the next battle.
Kamrul Huda, the SubDivisional Medical Officering Chittagong, died en route to investigate 
a rumored infected village on Sandwip Island. After his death, Dr. Huda’s wife shared his 
commitment. “If young girls have facial scars from smallpox, they will have difficulty 
getting married and in life.” Dr. Nick Ward, the expert on smallpox in the densely populated 
Dhaka, left Bangladesh two times when smallpox was under control. Two times smallpox in 
Dhaka reappeared; two times the first author requested Nick’s return and two times Nick 
returned.
AG Rangaraj, India’s first physician parachutist and a survivor of General Stillwell’s 
fighting during World War II, was a constant source of optimism. As the number of 
smallpox infected villages increased from 91 in October of 1974 to 1,280 in April of 1975, 
Rangar cheered us on daily with “Hang in there; it’s going to be alright.” Three years later, 
the first author again crossed path with “Rangar” in Somalia. When asked about his 
optimism, he replied “I never thought you had a chance in hell of winning; I had, however, 
learned during World War II in Burma that optimism was essential to survival during the 
worst of times.” Thus, it was his military training, rather than objective assessment of the 
data, that kept us going during the difficult times of 1975. Optimism is essential for 
eradication programs to succeed.
Human and Financial Resources
The Bangladesh Smallpox Eradication Program started out as a joint partnership of the 
Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization. Neither partner initially recognized 
the complexity of eradication or the resources that would be required. Through dialogue 
informed by data between the Bangladesh Ministry of Health and WHO, operational 
procedures were modified. In 1972, program staffing was limited to 45 Bangladeshis and 5 
internationals. As failures to achieve the three key objectives identified the need for 
additional resources, expansion of human and financial resources became an imperative. 
Over the 5 years of the Bangladesh program, 30,000 individuals including 225 internationals 
from 28 countries contributed to the program. During the 1975 final stages of household 
surveys and community-led containment, an estimated 152,000 person-days of labor were 
provided over a 3 month period [9]. The total cost of the program was US$15.6 million; the 
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Bangladesh Government provided 50.7% of these costs, US$7.9 million [2: 213]; the 
remainder of the funds, US$ 7.7 million were provided by WHO, other UN Organizations, 
and bilateral partners.
Esprit de Corps
Three factors contributed to the building and maintenance of Esprit de Corps:
• Each new team member was provided a short field mentored training as to 
his/her work responsibilities.
• A Smallpox Zero radio system enabled rapid communications and provided a 
venue for a weekly Sunday smallpox conference call.
• Monthly meetings were held at the national level.
The monthly meetings were held at the Smallpox Control Room known as Smallpox Zero. 
Sharing of information was critical to keeping all informed of the current status of 
eradication including:
• Monitoring progress toward the three objectives
• Identifying barriers to meeting the three objectives
• Developing improved or innovative strategies to address barriers
• Sharing successes, failures, and stories
• Maintaining and encourage morale, especially during difficult times
• Replenishing vaccine, money, and media supplies
Each meeting also included a social event to enable staff to let go, unwind, clean-up and 
renew friendships.
Civil Society Partnerships
Initially, reporting of smallpox was suppressed and containment was insensitive to local 
beliefs and values. As villagers saw that reports of smallpox were being responded to, they 
became active partners in reporting. Forty-four percent of the last 119 infected villages were 
reported by the public. The last case of Variola Major in the world was reported by 8 year 
old Bilkisunnessa, herself a victim of smallpox. Equally important was the involvement of 
communities in the containment of smallpox outbreaks. Additional information on the role 
of public partnerships is provided by Tarantola [6].
Not Accepting No as an Answer
An essential element of the program was not accepting no for an answer. As data identified 
the need for additional resources, an administrative response of no was occasionally 
received. With the data at hand, additional resources were almost always identified. When 
one operations officer went two months without an urgently needed boat, he hijacked a 
headquarters vehicle visiting his sight as ransom. The boat arrived two days later and the 
vehicle was returned. When an additional million dollars was needed, WHO Geneva found it 
in 7 days.
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BANGLADESH SMALLPOX ERADICATION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO OTHER 
ERADICATION PROGRAMS
Each disease candidate for eradication has its own unique characteristics. For smallpox, they 
were the easy clinical diagnosis, severity of debilitation during the time of maximum 
infectivity, and the relatively low rate of person-to-person transmission. Its challenges were 
political, logistic, and natural disasters.
Global eradication of a disease requires full understanding of the epidemiology; a full and 
common recognition of what is required in terms of commitment, technology, and resources; 
a field staff empowered to make evidence-based decisions to identify and address 
unexpected barriers, and most importantly optimism.
CONCLUSION
While the surveillance-containment strategy to eradicate smallpox was developed by the 
USAID-CDC Smallpox Eradication Measles Control Program in West and Central Africa in 
1970 [7], its effective implementation required adaptation to the realities of each country. 
Bangladesh was the most densely populated rural country in the world; the war had 
destroyed both the government and physical infrastructures. Almost all the bridges in the 
riverine country had been destroyed. Bangladesh lacked the health system and infrastructure 
to effectively implement an effective eradication strategy. In 1972, the program started out 
with a team of 50; only 11% of smallpox cases were reported. Using three indicators of 
progress – 1) detection of every new smallpox infected village within 14 days of the onset of 
rash in its first case, 2) public knowledge of the correct amount of the reward for reporting a 
previously undetected smallpox case, and 3) interruption of smallpox transmission within 14 
days of the identification of newly infected villages – programmatic failures were identified, 
analyzed, and remedied. Each smallpox case was in fact a program failure. Rather than 
being satisfied with successes, e.g., the falling number of reported smallpox cases, the 
expanded and decentralized infrastructure focused on identifying barriers to achievement of 
its objectives and to developing more effective intervention strategies.
Achievement of smallpox eradication was threatened by three events: 1) two coups d’état; 2) 
the devastating flood of 1974 and subsequent famine and migration of people including 
smallpox cases to the cities; and 3) the government decision to destroy the smallpox infected 
urban slums and resulting dissemination of smallpox throughout the country. Five program 
drivers led to the eventual eradication of smallpox in Bangladesh: 1) leadership and its 
decentralization to 415 Thanas, 2) expanded staffing (an increase from 50 persons per day in 
1972 to 1,300 persons per day at the time of maximum activity in 1975), and financial 
resources (US$ 1.12 million per year in 1972 to US$ 4.78 million per year in 1975); 3) esprit 
de corps through job-specific capacity strengthening, regular communications by radio, and 
monthly meetings; 4) civil society partnerships, where public volunteers took on major 
responsibilities for reporting smallpox cases and containing smallpox in infected villages; 
and 5) unwillingness to take no for an answer when evidence mandated affirmative 
responses.
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Figure 1. 
Geographic distribution of smallpox infected villages in Bangladesh. The distribution of 
infected villages during October 1974 (Figure 1A), January 1975 (Figure 1B), March 1975 
(Figure 1C), and April1975 (Figure 1D) illustrates the spatial spread of smallpox throughout 
Bangladesh following reintroduction.
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Figure 2. 
Smallpox infected villages and cases in Bangladesh, 1974-75. Smallpox incidence, as 
evidenced both by the number or infected villages and reported smallpox cases, increased 
from February to June in 1974 and September 1975.
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Figure 3. 
Results from the retrospective survey of smallpox facial scars conducted during 1976. 
Reported and unreported smallpox cases and percentages of the estimated annual totals that 
were reported each year in Bangladesh, 1972-75, the stacked bars and numbers, respectively.
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Figure 4. 
Secular improvement in smallpox reporting. The logistic equation, y(t) = 1/[1 + exp(3.24 - 
1.01t)], where t = time in years since 1 January 1971, was fitted to ratios of cases reported 
and estimated via the 1976 pockmark survey [3], the curve and points, respectively.
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Figure 5. 
Cases reported and estimated by correcting for reporting inefficiency. To estimate the actual 
numbers of cases, reports were multiplied by reciprocals of efficiencies obtained from the 
function illustrated in Figure 4, the solid and dashed lines with ‘×’ and ‘o’ symbols, 
respectively.
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Figure 6. 
Smallpox cases predicted by the transmission model [2] and “observed” in Bangladesh, 
1972-75. The symbols represent daily estimates obtained from the corrected monthly 
observations illustrated in Figure 5, adjusted to match the annual totals of Hughes and co-
workers [3].
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Figure 7. 
Impact of improved surveillance and containment on the reproduction number. Learning 
from failures reduced the average number of secondary infections per primary infection, the 
dotted line, which eventually converged on the threshold for elimination, the solid line.
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Figure 8. 
Failures to stop transmission within 14 days, Bangladesh 1974-75. Monthly percentages of 
villages having new smallpox cases 15 or more days after identification of smallpox infected 
village. The decrease in containment failures documents the increased timeliness and 
effectiveness of containment tasks.
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Table 2
Examples of Containment Failures and Actions Taken
Causes of Containment Failures Corrective Actions Taken
Smallpox cases were thirsty and hungry and left their 
houses in search of water and food
Program provided water and food to infected households
Folk belief uncovered that if you entered a smallpox 
house at midnight through the back door you would not 
get smallpox
Guard-vaccinators were posted at all house entrances day and night
Health workers were unwilling to live in infected 
village to oversee containment
Neighbors of infected house were recruited and trained to serve as guards, 
vaccinators, and searchers. Once local residents were hired to carry out containment 
and were being paid by the health workers, health workers had a place to stay and a 
source of food
Smallpox among the homeless Established isolation camps for cases where household isolation was not feasible
Smallpox cases among prostitutes Vaccinator guards posted to brothel to vaccinate prostitutes and customers
Vaccine. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 December 11.
